I n the future, the United States government can seek to limit the ownership of cyber weapons. The question is whether the Second Amendment to the United States Constitution gives a right to bear and own military-grade cyber weapons. The dual-use nature of cyber arms undermines the government's argument on this point.
If the U.S. government pursued the regulation of cyber weapons and the prohibition of private ownership of these arms, the question becomes if and how the right to bear arms would protect ownership of cyber weapons from governmental intervention. Another question is whether the Second
Constitutional Relevance of Digital Gun Rights
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides individuals and corporations with equal protection regarding the right to own advanced cyber weapons. In most cases, public debate over the Second Amendment is ideological, but there also is legal doctrine given by the U.S. Supreme Court in the verdict of District of Columbia v. Heller that culminates the aggregation of precedent covering more than two centuries. The Second Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, ratified 1791, was not only a product of the American Revolution and recognition of the state militias' contribution to the war effort, but also was an idea nurtured by early influencers of the Founding Fathers [1] , [2] . A hundred years before the American Revolution, Hobbes declared that the right to bear arms was a response to the lingering chaos of human conflict and without access to weapons, society would fall into a state of entropy. Montesquieu considered armed citizens a counter-balance to tyranny and the abuse of power. During the Virginia Convention in June 1776, when Jefferson and Mason worked to word the new constitution for the State of Virginia, they wrote that "no freeman should be debarred the use of arms." This phrase did not appear in the final bill [3] .
The Second Amendment to the U.S. Constitution reads as follows: "A well-regulated militia, being necessary to the security of a free state, the right of the people to keep and bear arms, shall not be infringed." The authors of the Bill of Rights and Second Amendment could have listed the weapons of their era, but instead used the general term, arms. Restrictions on the weapons that citizens have the right to bear have been implemented over time through litigation and guidance from the U.S. Supreme Court and precedents put forth through the legal system.
Dangerous and Unusual Weapons
In the most recent legal challenge to Second Amendment doctrine, addressed by the U.S. Supreme Court, a central legal question was what types of weapons are protected by the Second Amendment. If a weapon is "dangerous and unusual" under the U.S. Supreme Court's interpretation and verdict, then ownership of such a weapon is not protected by the Second Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution. If a weapon is deemed "dangerous and unusual," then the government is not hindered by the Second Amendment to forbid ownership and usage.
In their District of Columbia v. Heller verdict, the U.S. Supreme Court majority wrote [4] :
"We also recognize another important limitation on the right to keep and carry arms. Miller said, as we have explained, that the sorts of weapons protected were those 'in common use at the time.' 307 U. S., at 179. We think that limitation is fairly supported by the historical tradition of prohibiting the carrying of "dangerous and unusual weapons. The U.S. Supreme Court majority refer to cases that define unusual and dangerous weapons, and also to behaviors that could endanger others. In State v. Lanier (1874), a drunk man rides at a canter pace at midnight through a courthouse yard, which is considered an endangerment. The verdict of the North Carolina Supreme Court rejected the prosecution's premise. The North Carolina Supreme Court based its decision on the conditions surrounding the event: "We conceive that the riding through a courthouse or a street at 12 o'clock at night, when no one is present, is a very different thing from riding through at 12 o'clock in the day, when the courthouse or street is full of people." The fact that the man rode at a canter pace through town at midnight was not a public endangerment and did not break the peace. In English v. State, protected arms are defined as the arms of a militia, which are military-grade arms.
Dangerous Cyberweapons
The U.S. Supreme Court, with supporting legal precedence, has declared that only weapons that are not "dangerous and unusual" are permissible.
The next question is what would constitute a dangerous and unusual cyber weapon that would preclude ownership -including placement on computers -by Broader enhancement of human ability with digital technology presents an opportunity for personal attack by cyber weapons.
citizens. First, the existence and effect of the weapon must be known to the government and the lawmaker so it could be restricted. A militiaman is armed with his personal armament: rifle, bayonet, and sidearm. In the nondigital world, as an example, claymore mines and hand grenades are not permissible weapons for the citizenry, but are considered "dangerous and unusual" and therefore restricted to government use. The damage and hazards surrounding claymore mines and hand grenades are known to the government and the lawmaker. The tripwire will detonate the claymore mine, and the hand grenade is thrown without a clear understanding of the final impact and effect. The mine is autonomous in its execution, and the grenade is not sufficiently accurate, with a possibility of damages beyond the intended scope of the defender. These effects are known to the government. With cyberweapons, this decision path is different.
The lawmaker needs to be aware of cyberweapons and the means of restricting them. Otherwise, the result would be a ban on thought and innovation; the law would then arbitrarily punish what in retrospect is considered "dangerous and unusual cyberweapons" through law that is ex post facto legislation.
Definition of Cyber Arms
There no precise definition of cyber arms or their anticipated capabilities and effects of their utilization. One reason is that the very nature of software creates multiple purposes for utilization.
The U.S. Department of Defense has no codified, uniform definition, but refers to cyber arms as a "capability:" "a device, computer program, or technique, including any combination of software, firmware, or hardware, designed to create an effect in or through cyberspace" [5] .
The common definition of cyber arms is broad and comprehensive. One definition, by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCDOE), is [6] "…software, firmware or hardware designed or applied to cause damage through the cyber domain."
This definition is legally problematic because of the assumption that the intended usage of software, firmware, or hardware would alter the status of a nonweapon to a weapon. This contradicts elementary principles in the rule of law, where legal rules altered after the fact are referred to as ex post facto laws. The cyber community has yet not presented a commonly accepted definition, even if attempts have been made to define cyber weapons [7] .
The U.S. Constitution specifically prohibits this in Article 1, Section 9: "No Bill of Attainder or ex-post facto Law shall be passed [8] ."
The Second Amendment does not address the intent of the arms owner. In 1791, the right was derived from the status of a citizen in the newborn union of free colonies. The military-design, semi-automatic rifles that are protected by the Second Amendment and owned by citizens are primarily hunting rifles -in other words, a utility that could, if necessary, serve as a weapon of military conflict. There is a similarity between the gun-powder-propelled arms that are protected by the Second Amendment and dual-use hacking software since the software is dual-use as both utility and weapon. The network mapping tools, discovery tools, and port scanners are on one hand practical system administrative utilities for day-to-day business operations and also of direct military use in offensive probes and reconnaissance.
Unusual Weapons
In the legal precedence [9] , as exemplified by English v. State, 35Tex. 473, 476 (1871), Bowie knives, slungshots, daggers, and brass knuckles with no military value do not bring Second Amendment protection to bear. In the digital realm, the unusual is far harder to prove for the government when the weaponized software is in most cases of dual use. A computer user can use a port scanner to determine which ports are responding to calls to install a printer. Thus, the port scanner could be a hacking tool, but it could also be a civilian utility software. Networking mapping software, such as the open-source software Nmap [10] , is primarily a tool for network discovery. Hackers could use Nmap software to increase their knowledge of network topography, but Nmap is primarily a utility tool, not a weaponized, hacking tool. A way to weaponize the tool is to cluster multiple Nmap to achieve an ability to scan large portions of a network [11] . So the fact that clustered Nmap can be a weaponized tool and the single use of the software would give military and intelligence hackers a tool to do network discovery, even if never intended to be a military tool, rendering Nmap status as a military useful software. This dual use pertains not only in civilian and military realms, but also in the multiple purposes of cyberweapons as a weaponized software, and a networking utility Does the Second Amendment to the United States Constitution give the right to bear and own military-grade cyber weapons? undermines government support for framing a hacker tool as an "unusual" weapon [12] . If used by the defense establishment and the intelligence community a claim that it is an "unusual weapon" is nullified, because government through actions show that it is a "usual weapon." Because hacker and discovery tools are commonly used by both the military and civilians, and both communities utilize the same overarching information technology, such as wireless, sharing, data storage, Internet of Things, and communication [13] , [14] , the legal foundation for prohibiting civilian ownership of potentially weaponized software evaporates.
Corporate Cyber Rights to Bear Arms
The relationship between the militia, armed citizens, and lawmakers is a social contract where all parties surrender and receive. After the American Revolution, the creators of the Constitution and of the Bill of Rights that directly followed, were influenced by philosophical ideas of the time. These ideas included Hobbes's concept of the social contract, John Locke's right to rebel, and Montesquieu's idea of keeping the military force as close to the citizenry as possible to avoid tyranny. In the view of the framers of the Bill of Rights, an armed citizenry was a safeguard against abuse of power against the citizens.
In originalist thought, militiamen were volunteers ready to defend their state and community from hostile forces, and by doing so, risked their lives in the engagement. The militia is made up of citizens that have the right to bear arms. A militia risks the lives of its members to defend its community and state. Therefore, sui genesis a militia is mortal: a militiaman could die from combat wounds or succumb to disease and hardship as a result of combat. The militia takes a fatal risk, and does so to protect the state, and is therefore contributing to the state security. A militia is able, ready, and invested in the American enterprise.
Citizens have the right to bear arms, but citizens are assumed to be reasonable -what in Roman legal tradition described as bonus pater familias: the reasonable good family father -a father with sound judgment and values who will provide security when needed and defend his community. In the originalist view, the militia is presumed loyal to the state that emerged after the American Revolution. The Bill of Rights was ratified in 1791, less than ten years after the end of the American Revolutionary War, which divided the colonists of the 13 colonies into two camps: American revolutionaries and loyalists to the King of England. The militia gives the state manpower to protect the people of the state and the state itself if needed, surrendering their freedom partly by volunteering as militiamen and accepting a risk of loss of life, and gaining a right to bear arms. Each citizen who is given the right to bear arms does not need to be a member of the militia to execute and take favor of the right to bear arms, but the militia is recruited from the armed citizenry.
U.S. federal law establishes that a corporation is a U.S. person under federal laws and executive orders. The U.S. tax code Internal Revenue Code Section 7701(a)(30) defines a U.S. person as "a citizen or resident of the United States (including a lawful permanent resident residing abroad who has not formally notified the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services in order to abandon that status); a domestic partnership; a domestic corporation." The National Security Agency, supported by U.S. Presidential Executive Order 12333, states the following: "Federal law and executive order define a U.S. person as a citizen of the United States; an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence; an unincorporated association with a substantial number of members who are citizens of the U.S. or are aliens lawfully admitted for permanent residence; or, a corporation that is incorporated in the U.S."
The question is whether any corporation can claim Second Amendment rights to own military-grade cyber weapons as a part of the recruitment pool for the state militia and as free men with the right to bear arms.
Citizens Enter a Social Contract by Bearing Arms
The argument put forward here is that only a corporation that risks corporate death and demonstrates unquestionable loyalty to the United States could claim Second Amendment rights to own military-grade cyber arms. The rationale is that for the corporation to conceptually resemble a militia member, even though not every armed citizen is selected by the state for the militia, the corporation has to be unquestionable loyal, and if needed to defend, willing to take a risk to protect the state and the union.
American citizenship assumes a willingness to bear arms to defend the union; such willingness is also a requisite for naturalized citizenship. In the time of framing the Bill of Rights, bearing arms to defend had a tangible risk of becoming a fatality. If the corporation is so large that the risk the corporation takes is neglectable Larger corporations fail to meet the mortal requirement in the social contract between the militiamen and the state. and it cannot succumb to the wounds of defending, then the corporation is immortal and can fight for anyone that they favor at the moment. If so, then the corporation has more similarities with the soldering mercenary than the loyal citizen bestowed with gun rights. If there is no risk, there is no investment in the defense of liberty. A corporate death is the dissolution of the corporation and liquidation of assets, often through a non-restructuring bankruptcy. If a corporation is large enough to survive and sustain operations after a failed cyber engagement, it cannot have Second Amendment rights to access military-grade cyber weapons. Therefore, any larger corporation would be a U.S. person, but would not meet the criteria to bear arms under the Second Amendment. The larger corporation is not a part of the social contract between the framers of the Bill of Rights and, at the time, the political leadership of the United States of America and its states, as well as the citizens of those states. The large corporation could instead be seen as a rich landowner who wants to arm his subordinates and workers, creating a private army within the nation-state, and not embody a militiaman. The government could entrust larger corporations to own and utilize military-grade cyber weapons, but ownership is based on a unilateral decision by the government and is not founded on the Second Amendment.
Those Who Bear Arms are Loyal to the United States of America
Loyalty to the United States of America is a qualifier for the right to bear arms, and if not expressed at the individual level, then a corporation that forms a smaller militia would not gain the right to own cyber weapons unless its loyalty to the state is unquestionable. The Second Amendment to the U.S. Constitution reads as follows: "A well-regulated militia, being necessary to the security of a free state, the right of the people to keep and bear arms, shall not be infringed." The militia is, according to the framers of the Bill of Rights, "necessary to the security of the free state." A defender and provider of security to the free state must be loyal to the state. Otherwise, the right to bear arms would provide a right to arm loyalists to the English Crown, and in the context of contemporary America any group that wants to overthrow the American government or support enemies of the state, as well.
In 1791, the United States had only eight years earlier emerged as a free nation liberated through a rebellion against a former colonial power that lasted seven years. The American Revolution split families and communities. Friends became enemies as colonists chose either to join the revolution or to support continued British rule of the 13 colonies as loyalists to the Crown.
The framers of the Bill of Rights sought to protect the people from what they saw as oppression under British rule. In the Second Amendment, a prerequisite is an unquestionable loyalty to the newborn nation and its states. The right to bear arms is reserved only for those loyal to the new republic. The Bill of Rights catalogs what the rebellious colonists considered wrong with British rule and provided remedies to protect the rights of the people of the new republic from abuse, tyranny, and absence of the rule of law. The rationale for the Bill of Rights is that it provided a legal foundation for securing the freedom and liberty gained through the American revolution. As an example, the Third Amendment reads as follows: "No soldier shall, in time of peace, be quartered in any house without the consent of the owner, nor in time of war but in a manner to be prescribed by law." The Third Amendment is a safeguard against the British practice of quartering soldiers in civilian homes without providing compensation or seeking homeowners' consent.
Similarly, the Fourth Amendment states: "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized." The Fourth Amendment protects against the British practice of arbitrarily and without any factual support conducting searches and seizures of colonists' property and dwellings. The Fourth Amendment introduces probable cause as a threshold for government intervention.
Larger corporations fail to meet the mortal requirement in the social contract between the militiamen and the state, and also fail to meet the loyalty requirement because they operate in and have ties with foreign countries; therefore, larger corporations, and especially multinational corporations, have no Second Amendment right to own or use military-grade cyber weapons.
Therefore, only smaller, non-multinational corporations that can fail and be forced to dissolve and liquidate as a result of a cyber engagement can claim the right to own and use military-grade cyber weapons under the Second Amendment.
Larger corporations also fail to meet the loyalty requirement because they operate in and have ties with foreign countries.
Prohibition of Zero-Day Exploits
A zero-day exploit is a vulnerability that is unknown to anyone except its discoverer [15] . The IT industry, the computer security community, and the defense establishment are unaware of the vulnerability. After the zeroday exploit is found, a tool could be designed to take full advantage of the exploit.
This zero-day exploit tool could be "dangerous and unusual," but still is permissible to own based on the fact that the exploit the tool is targeting is unknown to the government.
In any country that has submitted to the rule of law and democratic foundations, the government cannot ban and criminalize what it doesn't know or create all-encompassing penal codes for such scenarios. If a government is unaware of a zero-day exploit and until the utilization of the zero-day exploit, not only the exploit is unknown, but also the extent of the effects and damage created by its exploitation, the zero-day exploit is permissible to own. A tool that exploits zero-day exploits could only be prohibited after execution. Under the rule of law, and through the Anglo common law tradition, the government cannot preemptively ban speech that is not protected by the First Amendment until it has happened. The authorities cannot prosecute a person who intends to deliver a criminalized hate speech, because the factual illegality is unknown. Even if the intent from the creator of the zeroday exploit is to create mayhem and digital destruction, it is still permissible to own the undisclosed zero-day exploitation tool because the burden of proof is on the government and the government is unable to formulate a case against the unknown zero-day exploitation tool.
The Castle Doctrine
The scope of this paper is cyber arms in the light of the Second Amendment. In the public discourse, the Second Amendment and the Castle Doctrine tend to part of the same discussion. The Castle Doctrine has also been used as an argument to support legalization of corporate hack back (cyber counterstrikes) [16] .
The Castle Doctrine is a common-law doctrine [17] that supports the individual's option, without prosecution or penalty, to use force in defending his residence and family. If attacked, there traditionally has been an obligation to retreat to avoid bodily harm and risk to human life. The Castle Doctrine supersedes the obligation to retreat if the attack occurs in the personal realm that the doctrine covers based on state-level precedence. In some states, the doctrine extends to an individual's vehicles and workplace. The Castle Doctrine's lineage extends to older English common law, under which a citizen was considered to have a right to peace and safety in his own home. The Second Amendment and the Castle Doctrine are separate; where the Second Amendment is the federal right to bear arms, the Castle Doctrine is state-level legislation to define the boundaries between excessive force, the obligation to retreat, and the use of lethal force to defend one's life and property. The Second Amendment right to own and bear arms does not provide a right to protect life and property using deadly or significant force. Therefore, any citizen's utilization of military grade cyber weapons owned and procured under the rights given by the Second Amendment to protect himself from physically harmful cyber attacks is contingent not only on federal legislation as exemplified by the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA) [18] , but also by state legislation. As our society merges human ability and physiology with digital mechanisms and initiates a broader use of digital-human enhancement, creating a personal attack surface for digital arms, the question of a cyber Castle Doctrine is a useful analogy from the non-digital reality.
Visible Legal Doctrine
Currently, there is no cyber Second Amendment as a first court tested case, referred to a case of the first impression, on the docket. Such a case would trigger a legal development and clarification, but already a distinct legal doctrine is visible. According to the inquiry, the citizenry has the right to own and operate cyber arms under identical conditions as firearms. The current U.S. legal doctrine states that "unusual and dangerous" arms can be prohibited. The majority of the hacking, network discovery, and information systems probing and exploiting tools are of military utility and value as enablers of cyber capacity even if in civilian hands [19] . Therefore, these tools cannot be considered unusual in the light of the Second Amendment.
The question then becomes whether these cyber arms are dangerous. The legal doctrine has developed an allowance for prohibiting dangerous weapons that would harm the public beyond an intended military use or that lack safeguards such as intent by arming and using the weapon. The labeling of a weapon as "dangerous" would require that a cyber weapon autonomously initiate attacks without any human interaction, as intent is not required when the weapon is assessed on its own merits, and this is not applicable to the vast majority of cyber weapons.
The case for government intervention and prohibition of cyber arms faces significant constitutional limitations.
An example of what could be considered dangerous could be software that autonomously attacks other information systems at the bootup of a networked computer. The software has no controlled harm creation, but instead -without any intent at the moment of engagement, nor human control -starts attacking other systems. Such software could be prohibited.
The current Second Amendment doctrine would not exclude cyber arms unless these arms are of no military value or not suitable for military use, or require no intent to be dangerous for the general population. The Second Amendment protects individual ownership of cyber arms, and to a degree protects corporate ownership of cyber arms. The case for government intervention and prohibition of cyber arms faces significant constitutional limitations to be a realistic policy option.
